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“[N]umerous mechanical devices threaten to make
good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the
closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”1
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Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
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INTRODUCTION
In 1890, the Harvard Law Review published Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis’s article, The Right to Privacy,2 changing
forever the face of privacy law.3 Arguably, Warren and Brandeis
attempted to import an idea of privacy more at home in Europe
than here in the United States,4 for they sought to establish a means
by which people could protect their own dignity;5 however, they
only tenuously founded that means on aspects of personal liberty.6
Thus, the approach the two path-breaking authors took may
represent an anomaly in the law of this country.7 While various
2

Id.
Cf. ALPHEUS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946); Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
326, 327 (1966) (describing Warren and Brandeis’s article as the “most influential law
review article of all”).
4
See James Q. Whitman, The Two Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1204 (2004) (“Warren and Brandeis undertook the seminal, and still
most cited, effort to introduce a [European]-style right of privacy into American law.”).
5
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214–15 (“The design of the law must be to
protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from
being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all persons,
whatsoever; their position and station, from having matters which they may properly
prefer to keep private, made public against their will.”). Warren and Brandeis also
equated the right to privacy to “the more general right to the immunity of the person,—
the right to one’s personality.” Id. at 207.
6
Noticeably, Warren and Brandeis, while drawing many analogies to other areas of
law such as intellectual property, did not directly implicate constitutional liberty
concerns, such as the Fourth Amendment, or a notion of “freedom.” See id. at 207.
While they did note early in their article that the rights to liberty and property have
expanded as society has developed, they did so to illustrate how “the beautiful capacity
for growth which characterizes the common law enabled the judges to afford the requisite
protection, without interposition of the legislature.” Id. at 195.
7
Compare William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (suggesting
that privacy is not an independent value at all but rather a composite of interests), with
3
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forms of the tort protecting against invasion of privacy exist today
under state common law, shortly after the time Warren and
Brandeis made their argument for the tort, the focus of privacy law
in this country returned to a foundation more uniquely American—
one based on liberty.8
Why does each side of the Atlantic concentrate on a different
aspect of personhood, liberty versus dignity, as the core inviolable
right warranting privacy protection? Perhaps the United States
favors values of liberty, especially liberty against the government,
due to its founding influences. That may explain why the
American right to privacy, at its core, means freedom from
intrusions of the state, especially in one’s own home.9 Similarly,
maybe European favor for values of dignity stems from an Old
World ethos, concerned with the importance of not losing public
face. After all, Europeans consider privacy to be the right to
protect one’s personal reputation from attack and one’s personal
information from exposure or mishandling.10

Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 964 (1964) (analyzing privacy tort law in light of
Warren and Brandeis to show how Prosser was mistaken).
8
In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, which found a government wiretap to be
constitutional, Brandeis quoted an earlier decision of the Supreme Court. Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474–75 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). He explained,
“‘The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty
and security[,]’” and “‘[i]t is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense,’” rather “‘it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.’” Id.
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). Brandeis went further to
note, “Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to
the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of
what is whispered in the closet.” Id. at 473. While Brandeis occupied the minority in
Olmstead, the Court ultimately accepted his view, at least to some extent, in Katz v.
United States. See 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (addressing the “sanctity” of the home); see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE
UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 5 (2000).
10
See Whitman, supra note 4, at 1161 (describing the core European privacy rights as
the “rights to one’s image, name, and reputation, and what the Germans call the right to
information self-determination—the right to control the sorts of information disclosed
about oneself” (emphasis omitted)).
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Whether the foundation of the liberty versus dignity distinction
came about for the reasons above, or for other reasons, matters
little for purposes of this Article. What really matters is the legal
effect of the distinction. While, on both sides of the Atlantic, the
differences in privacy policies influence many areas of law, this
Article focuses on but one of those areas: privacy in the workplace.
Currently, workers in the United States face the risk that their
employers will monitor them, not only as to their activities in the
ordinary course of business, but also as to their personal electronic
communications made from work.11 To be sure, the potential for
real monetary and legal liabilities often forms a valid cause for
concern, which motivates employers to monitor their employees,
but that does not mean that the employees should be completely
without protections. Yet, the current laws do little to protect
employees from unwanted and unnecessary surveillance by their
employers.
To remedy this problem, Congress should increase the level of
protection it provides to employees by supplementing the liberty
considerations of American privacy law with some of the dignity
protections found in Europe. Specifically, Congress should modify
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) by
amending the consent provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)12 and
adding a similar consent provision to § 2701(c).13 In each case, the
amendment should require express written consent of the person
subject to monitoring. Without such consent, an entity engaged in
11

For an earlier treatment of this topic area, see Note, Addressing the New Hazards of
the High Technology Workplace, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1898 (1991).
12
Section 2511(2)(d) provides an exception to liability for an interception of a
communication, stating:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where such person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception unless such communication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any
State.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
13
Section 2702(b)(3) also provides an exception to liability for divulging the contents
of a stored communication when consent exists. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3). However,
that exception only applies to an entity providing a public, not a private, service. Id.
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the surveillance of its employees should face liability for obtaining
personal information from an electronic communication. In order
to give these new consent provisions effect, Congress would also
have to make a few other amendments to the ECPA.14
Part I of this Article examines privacy and consent to
monitoring of electronic communications in the workplace from an
American prospective. It considers the American model of privacy
protection, which advances notions of personal liberty. Part I also
looks at the justifications for monitoring and the current state of
protection in private and public workplaces. Part II examines
privacy and consent to monitoring from a European perspective. It
considers the European model of privacy protection, which
advances notions of personal dignity. Part II also looks at a couple
of international mechanisms that protect privacy. Part III of this
Article suggests that the United States should consider the
importance of dignity as a basis for privacy law. Part III further
advances some amendments that would strengthen the consent
provisions of ECPA, making it more consistent with the workplace
dignity protections found in Europe. As a final matter, Part III
stresses the importance of a default rule that protects privacy in
employees’ personal communications. In conclusion, this Article
posits that amending ECPA to include an explicit consent
provision would heighten and respect employee liberty and
dignity. In so doing, the amendment would respond to the century
old call of Warren and Brandeis: to find a place for dignity in
American privacy law.
I. THE AMERICAN MODEL
A. Privacy as an Aspect of Personal Liberty
As mentioned previously, the United States bases its privacy
rights on a strong sense of personal liberty. One can see the
distinction laid out in the founding documents of this country,

14

See infra Part III.B. For instance, to make any consent provision under § 2701(c)
meaningful, another exception, § 2701(c)(1), would have to be eliminated for employers
providing a wire or communications service to employees. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c).
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especially in the Bill of Rights, with its strong circumscription of
state power.15 From the late 1700’s to the present, suspicion of the
government has formed the underpinning of American privacy
thinking.16 A classic statement comes from the seminal case Boyd
v. United States,17 where the Supreme Court noted that the
Constitution provides protection from “all invasions on the part of
the government . . . of the sanctity of a man’s home.”18 More
recently, the Supreme Court used similar language. In Kyllo v.
United States,19 the majority affirmed that the Constitution “draws
‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’”20 Boyd and Kyllo
illustrate how, for Americans, privacy begins with the Fourth
Amendment; “at its origin, [it] is the right against unlawful
searches and seizures.”21 Another recent decision, Lawrence v.
Texas,22 takes what seems like a dignity interest, the right to
engage in private homosexual relations, and makes it one of
liberty.23 That decision begins with the statement, “Liberty
protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a
dwelling or other private places.”24 Privacy then, in the United
States, means the liberty to be free from government intrusions,
above all, in one’s home.
United States laws suggest Americans hold much less
suspicion for business entities than for the government. Most
constitutional protections do not even directly apply to private
businesses, except when those businesses act at the direction of the
state.25 Some federal laws and regulations create privacy rights
15

See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See Whitman, supra note 4, at 1211–12.
17
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
18
Id. at 630.
19
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
20
Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
21
Whitman, supra note 4, at 1212. Yet, “[o]ver time . . . the early republican
commitment to ‘privacy’ has matured into a much more far-reaching right against state
intrusion into our lives.” Id.
22
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
23
See id. at 562; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
24
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
25
In order for a private entity to face liability for violating the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights, a plaintiff must first establish that the entity acts in coordination
with the government under the “state action doctrine.” See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases,
16
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against private companies;26 however, these statutes provide spotty
protections at best. Some only cover a target industry or a select
class of people,27 while others include exceptions for actions
broader than conduct “in the ordinary course of business.”28
Accordingly, when private employers feel they need to monitor
their employees, current laws give the employees little recourse.
Government employees do not fare much better, as they only enjoy
weak protections under the Constitution.
B. Factors Justifying Monitoring
Valid concerns justify some level of employer monitoring of
employee electronic communications. For instance, an employee’s
activities through email and the Internet while on the job could
create a hostile work environment for other workers. The
employee might send sexually charged emails to a co-worker,29
surf sexually explicit websites in plain view of others, or post false
statements about someone. Alternatively, the employee might
download unauthorized copies of music or video. In this way,
employers that provide computer services could face liability for
“employees’ sexual, racial, or otherwise threatening or harassing
109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638–40 (1882); Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879); see also Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451,
461 (1952) (applying the state action requirement to federal constitutional claims). See
generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of
Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302
(1995). The article describes the difficult analysis required “when the actions of an
ostensibly ‘private’ entity violate constitutional norms, and the entity enjoys some kind of
special relationship or connection to the federal or a state government.” Id. at 303.
26
See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506
(2006); Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006); Stored Communications Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006); Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2006); Cable
Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 551–561 (2006).
27
Notably, from the examples listed, supra note 26, the Cable Communications Policy
Act only applies to cable operators, service providers and subscribers. See 47 U.S.C. §
552–561. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act only protects children under the
age of thirteen. 15 U.S.C § 6501(1).
28
See infra Part I.C.
29
Two cases come to mind in this context. In Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.,
an employee’s supervisor stated in an email, “I know I’m getting to be a pain [in] the butt
with these ride offers. And I apologize. But I can’t help myself.” 112 F.3d 853, 864 (7th
Cir. 1997). In Knox v. Indiana, a co-worker sent an email message, asking the plaintiff if
she would like to have a “horizontal good time.” 93 F.3d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1996).
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[emails] or Internet [use] or messages, as well as for defamation,
copyright infringement, fraud or other claims related to employee
misconduct.”30
The risk of losing intellectual property rights forms another
important concern, justifying some level of surveillance. Trade
secret law requires companies to undertake reasonable efforts to
maintain the secrecy of proprietary information.31
This
information can include any “formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process” that derives its
value “from not being generally known to . . . other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”32 A trade
secret loses its status as a secret, and therefore its protection, when
others learn the secret without using improper means.33 Thus,
trade secret law seems to require some level of monitoring to
prevent accidental or intentional breaches of secrecy.
The risks of potential liability and of losing valuable
intellectual property rights act as primary motivating factors
behind employer surveillance of employees.34 While these risks do
justify some level of monitoring, especially as to activities in the
ordinary course of business,35 the risks hardly justify carte blanche

30

Mark E. Schreiber, Employer E-Mail and Internet Risks, Policy Guidelines and
Investigations, 85 MASS. L. REV. 74, 74–75 (2000) (arguing that “[t]o deter inappropriate
use and to protect themselves better, employers should implement, disseminate, and
enforce e-mail and Internet use policies that are tailored to their specific business needs”
and that “the policy should state the manner in which employees’ business and/or
personal e-mail or Internet communications can or will be accessed or monitored by the
company”).
31
Particularly, a trade secret must be “the subject of efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (2004).
32
Id.
33
Id. at § 1 cmt. (“[R]easonable efforts to maintain secrecy have been held to include
advising employees of the existence of a trade secret, limiting access to a trade secret on
[a] ‘need to know basis,’ and controlling plant access.”).
34
See Michael L. Rustad & Sandra L. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-Mail and
Internet Usage: Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from Europe, 7
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 829, 836–839 (2005) (“Monitoring [email] or Internet usage is
justified, because the mishandling of these technologies is not a phantom risk.”).
35
See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. (“The efforts required to maintain secrecy are
those ‘reasonable under the circumstances.’ The courts do not require that extreme and
unduly expensive procedures be taken to protect trade secrets against flagrant industrial
espionage.”).
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authority to monitor personal electronic communications made
from work as “workers who [are] electronically monitored
manifest[] higher rates of depression, anxiety, and fatigue than
others in the same business that [are] not monitored.”36
C. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
In 1968, after the Supreme Court found telephone
conversations subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy37 and
proposed extensive limitations on eavesdropping,38 Congress
enacted the Wiretap Act.39 The Act criminalized private wiretaps,
but allowed an exception for the wiretapping of a communication
when one party consented to the tapping.40 In 1986, Congress
updated the Wiretap Act by passing the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, adding a provision to make the Act
apply to the interception of electronic communications.41 ECPA
also included two new acts, the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”) and the Pen Register Act. As its name suggests, the SCA
protects electronic communications in storage.42
While the Wiretap Act and the SCA provide some protection
for the electronic communications of individuals, they do little to
protect employees from the surveillance of their employers
36

Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 840.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
38
See Berger v. State of N.Y., 388 U.S. 41, 58–60 (1967).
39
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended as Title I of ECPA at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
(2006)).
40
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(d).
41
Title I of ECPA, the updated Wiretap Act, defines an “intercept” as “the aural or
other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through
the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006).
42
Title II of ECPA, the SCA, creates civil liability for one who “(1) intentionally
accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)
(2006). The statute defines “electronic storage” as “(A) any temporary, intermediate
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication
service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)
(2006).
37
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because business entities receive broad exceptions under each act.
For instance, Congress created service provider exceptions under
both the Wiretap Act and the SCA. The Wiretap Act allows a
communications service provider “to intercept, disclose, or use [a]
communication in the normal course of [its] employment while
engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the
rendition of [its] service or to the protection of the rights or
property of the provider of that service.”43
The SCA’s service provider exception is broader than the one
found in the Wiretap Act, entirely exempting “the person or entity
providing a wire or electronic communications service.”44 Another
exception, the ordinary course of business exception, pertains
primarily to the Wiretap Act. It limits the definition of a
wiretapping device of an employer to an “electronic, mechanical,
or other device” other than one used “in the ordinary course of its
business.”45
Courts have interpreted the service provider exceptions broadly
in the employment context, classifying many businesses as
electronic communications service providers. For instance, in
United States v. Mullins,46 the Ninth Circuit found that American
Airlines qualified as a provider of wire or electronic
communication service under § 2511(2)(a) of the Wiretap Act.47
Mullins involved three travel agents’ appeal from a conviction for
mail and wire fraud.48 The defendants leased computer terminals
43

18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a) (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2006).
45
This section provides:
(5) “electronic, mechanical, or other device” means any device or
apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication other than—
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or
any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a
provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary
course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the
ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user
for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the
ordinary course of its business . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (2006).
46
United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1993).
47
Id. at 1478.
48
Id. at 1474.
44
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from American Airlines so that they could access American’s
electronic travel booking service.49 American Airlines assigned
the agents personal access codes and passwords, allowing them to
place and edit reservations on its system.50 After receiving notice
of an anomaly on the passenger manifest of a flight returning from
Europe, American Airlines personnel monitored the activity
associated with the agents’ codes and passwords.51 The company
then notified the FBI that it suspected the agents purposefully
manipulated the passenger manifests.52 The FBI investigated the
incident, and the case went to trial.53 At the district court, all three
agents received sentences that included jail time and substantial
fines.54
On appeal, the defendant agents argued that American’s
monitoring violated their Fourth Amendment rights.55 In rejecting
the agents’ argument, the Ninth Circuit cited the definitions section
of the Wiretap Act.56 The court found that the service provider
exception permitted American to monitor the defendants’ use of its
electronic travel booking service.57 The court also found that
American Airlines consented to the monitoring of its own
system,58 which qualified its surveillance for another exception
under the Wiretap Act.59
In Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,60 the Third
Circuit found that the SCA provides an even broader service

49

Id. This case took place shortly before the Internet created a dearth of demand for
travel agency services.
50
Id. at 1474–75.
51
Id. Due to the security atmosphere of this country following September 11, 2001,
courts would probably now find an even broader exception for this type of airline
computer system monitoring.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. (“The district court sentenced [one agent] to 48 months’ imprisonment and
imposed a $250,000 fine; [the second agent] received a 24-month jail term and a $15,000
fine; and [the third agent] got 21 months and a $5,000 fine.”).
55
Id. at 1478.
56
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511).
57
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
58
Mullins, 992 F.2d at 1478.
59
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006).
60
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003).
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provider exception for businesses.61 There, the court read §
2701(c) of the SCA to “except from . . . protection all searches by
communications service providers.”62 Fraser involved a wrongful
termination claim brought by a former agent of Nationwide, an
insurance company.63 The plaintiff also requested damages under
ECPA,64 for violations of both the Wiretap Act and the SCA.65
The facts of the case indicate that Nationwide believed the plaintiff
was “disloyal” in his service to the company.66 In order to
substantiate this belief, Nationwide searched all of the plaintiff’s
email on its server, looking for email to or from the plaintiff that
showed improper behavior.67 At trial, a representative for
Nationwide testified that the search proved the plaintiff’s
disloyalty, so Nationwide was justified in terminating him.68 After
interpreting ECPA, the district court granted summary judgment to
Nationwide.69
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision.70 As to the Wiretap Act claim, the Third Circuit
found that the searching of email in storage did not qualify as an
“interception” as required by the act because the searching did not
occur contemporaneously with transmission of the email.71 As to
the SCA claim, the Third Circuit held that Nationwide fell under

61

Id. at 115.
Id. (emphasis added). To come to its holding, the court in Fraser compared the facts
of the case to the facts in Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996). The
Bohach court held that the Reno police department could, without violating the SCA,
retrieve pager text messages stored on the police department's computer system because
the department “is the provider of the ‘service’” and “service providers [may] do as they
wish when it comes to accessing communications in electronic storage.” Id. at 1236;
Fraser, 352 F.3d at 115.
63
Fraser, 352 F.3d at 109.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 113–15.
66
Id. at 109.
67
Id. at 110.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 114.
70
Id. at 115.
71
Id. at 114.
62
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the service provider exception because it administered the email
system that it searched.72
While not pertaining directly to electronic communications, the
case Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co.73 provides a framework for
interpreting the ordinary course of business exception. There, the
Eleventh Circuit held that a personal communication may “be
intercepted in the ordinary course of business . . . to the extent
necessary to guard against unauthorized use of [equipment
furnished by the business] or to determine whether the call is
personal or not.”74
In Watkins, the plaintiff sued her employer, alleging a violation
of the Wiretap Act.75 The circumstance of the alleged violation
surrounded a personal telephone call that the plaintiff made from
work to a friend, where she talked about a job interview she
recently had with another company.76 The plaintiff’s employer
monitored the call and approached her about it.77 The monitoring
upset the plaintiff, and eventually, she left her employer for the
other company.78 As to her Wiretap Act claim, the district court
granted summary judgment on the merits to the defendant, her
employer.79
On appeal, the parties did not dispute that the monitoring at
issue violated § 2511(1)(b) of the Wiretap Act;80 so, the Eleventh
Circuit only examined whether the defendant’s conduct came

72

Id. at 115. As to the SCA claim, the district court had found that the email was in
“post-transmission storage.” Id. at 114. In affirming, the Third Circuit avoided using
those grounds to reach its result. Id.
73
Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
74
Id. at 583.
75
Id. at 579. As Congress did not pass ECPA until 1986, the plaintiff sued under the
predecessor of the current Wiretap Act, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968. Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. After tempers flared over the incident, her boss fired her. Id. However, she
complained to another supervisor and got reinstated with apologies. Id. Nonetheless, the
plaintiff eventually went to work for the company where she had the interview that her
employer overheard her talking about. Id.
79
Id. at 579–80.
80
Id. at 580.
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within either one of two exemptions to the Act.81 First, the court
addressed the consent exception, noting that “[c]onsent may be
obtained for any interceptions” and that “the business or personal
nature of the [communication] is entirely irrelevant.”82 However,
the court did comment on the importance of the scope of the
consent,83 and it found that the plaintiff consented to a policy of
monitoring sales calls but not personal calls.84 As the defendant
likely exceeded the scope of the consent by continuing to monitor
the call after learning of its personal nature, the court found the
defendant’s conduct probably fell outside of the consent
exception.85
Next, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the ordinary course of
business exception. As a general rule, it noted that “if the
intercepted [communication is] a business call, then . . . monitoring
of it was in the ordinary course of business. If it was a personal
[communication], the monitoring was probably, but not certainly,
not in the ordinary course of business.”86 The court then
explained, “[A] personal call may be intercepted in the ordinary

81

Id. The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the
plaintiff’s claims under a duplicative provision of the Communications Act. Id.
82
Id. at 581 (noting that as long as the requisite business connection is demonstrated,
the business extension exemption represents the “circumstances under which nonconsensual interception” does not violate section 2511(1)(b) (citing Briggs v. Am. Air
Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 419 (5th Cir.1980))).
83
Watkins, 704 F.2d at 582. The Eleventh Circuit noted:
We can think of no reason why consent under [the Wiretap Act]
cannot be limited. We therefore hold that consent within the meaning
of section 2511(2)(d) is not necessarily an all or nothing proposition;
it can be limited. It is the task of the trier of fact to determine the
scope of the consent and to decide whether and to what extent the
interception exceeded that consent.
Id.
84
Id. at 581.
85
Id. at 582. However, the Eleventh Circuit did direct the district court to settle the
factual issues surrounding the consent on remand. Id. at 585 (“Among the factual
questions that should be considered are: What was the monitoring policy to which
Watkins consented?”).
86
Id. at 582 (“The phrase ‘in the ordinary course of business’ cannot be expanded to
mean anything that interests a company. Such a broad reading ‘flouts the words of the
statute and establishes an exemption that is without basis in the legislative history’ of [the
Wiretap Act].” (quoting Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 1979))).
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course of business to determine its nature, but never its contents.”87
Yet, instead of holding for the plaintiff, the Eleventh Circuit
remanded to the district court, charging it to determine whether the
plaintiff’s employer learned of the plaintiff’s job interview during
a permissible window of interception.88 While the court suggested
the permissible window for determining the nature of a call was
less than three minutes, it left that determination to the trial court.89
Of the three cases described above, only Watkins draws a line
between the interception of communications to protect legitimate
business interests and the interception of purely personal
communications, making the latter a likely violation of the Wiretap
Act.
In Mullins, the Ninth Circuit may have rightly found that the
monitoring conducted by American Airlines did not violate
ECPA;90 however, the court did so without determining the scope
of permissible monitoring. Perhaps American Airlines should
receive an exemption under ECPA for monitoring fraudulent
activities on its system because fraud represents an affront to
American’s legitimate business concerns, but that exemption
should not broadly stem from it providing a wire or electronic
communication service. Additionally, to the extent the analysis in
Mullins suggests that the party conducting the monitoring of an
employee or agent can consent to the monitoring itself,91 the
decision presents an unworkable interpretation of ECPA,
effectively eviscerating the statute’s protections.
The decision reached by the Third Circuit in Fraser suffers
from greater problems. The court’s interpretation of the Wiretap
Act places all employee email communications under the sole
protection of the SCA.92 This solution is problematic because an
employer can avoid reading an email “contemporaneous with
87

Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
89
Id. at 584. “It has been widely advertised that one may reach out by telephone and
touch all sorts of people in 3 minutes or less; it seems to us that it should not take that
long to determine whether a call is of a personal or a business nature.” Id. at 585 n.10.
90
See supra notes 46–58 and accompanying text.
91
United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993).
92
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003).
88
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transmission,” and instead, it can resort to a stored copy of the
email.93 The Fraser court’s interpretation of ECPA would not
necessarily harm the privacy interests of employees if it were not
for the blanket immunity the courts give business entities for
searches of stored communications they conduct on email systems
they provide. Absent from the court’s analysis was whether ECPA
restricts the scope of the search to communications in which the
employer has a legitimate business concern.
Even the analysis in Watkins presents some troubling
implications. There, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that the scope
of consent should have limitations and that consent “is not to be
cavalierly implied;”94 however, the court did, in fact, imply
consent. The court found that a stated policy of monitoring sales
calls, along with the plaintiff’s knowledge of the policy when she
accepted employment, created consent to the monitoring of sales
calls.95 Thus, the analysis of Watkins allows a loophole through
which businesses can escape all liability under ECPA. An
employer need only have a stated policy, to which an employee
need not even explicitly convey consent, that it may monitor all
business and personal calls.
D. The Lack of Safeguards under the Fourth Amendment
As mentioned earlier, employees working for private
employers receive little help from the Constitution because it
“erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.”96
Particularly, the Fourth
Amendment “does not protect against a search or seizure by a
private party on its own initiative, even if the search or seizure is
an arbitrary action.”97 However, despite their constitutional
protections, government employees fare little better than private
employees when subjected to monitoring by their employers.

93
94
95
96
97

See supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text.
Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983).
Id.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 264, 271 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
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O’Connor v. Ortega98 illustrates how little constitutional
protection government employees receive when their employers
monitor or search their personal communications. There, the
Supreme Court found that “a probable cause requirement for
searches . . . would impose intolerable burdens on public
employers.”99
In Ortega, the plaintiff, a physician and psychiatrist, filed suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his employers had violated
the rights provided to him under the Fourth Amendment.100 The
potential Fourth Amendment violation stemmed from a search that
the plaintiff’s employer conducted.101 The plaintiff’s supervisor,
the executive director of the public hospital where he worked,
suspected that the plaintiff had engaged in improprieties while
running the hospital’s residency program.102
In order to
substantiate his suspicions, the executive director placed the
plaintiff on administrative leave and appointed a team to conduct
an investigation of the plaintiff’s activities.103 The leader of the
investigative team decided to conduct a thorough search of the
plaintiff’s office while he was away.104 The team entered the
office a number of times and seized some of the plaintiff’s
personal items from his desk and file cabinet.105 After the team
concluded its investigation, the hospital terminated the plaintiff’s
employment.106
In considering whether the above search violated the plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment rights, first the Court determined whether the
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office.107
The undisputed evidence disclosed that the plaintiff did not share
98

O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
Id. at 724.
100
Id. at 714.
101
Id. at 713.
102
Id. at 712–13.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 713.
105
Id. These items included a Valentine’s Day card, a photograph, and book of poetry.
Id. A former resident physician had sent these items to the plaintiff, and, at a hearing
before the state personnel board, the plaintiff’s employer used them to impeach her
credibility when she testified on the plaintiff’s behalf. Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 715–16.
99
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his desk or file cabinets with any other employees and that he kept
only personal communications and communications with patients
unconnected with the hospital in his office, along with his personal
financial records and some personal gifts and mementos.108
Notably, the plaintiff did not keep any files on physicians in
residency training in his office.109 Thus, the Court found the
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and
file cabinet.110
Next, the Court turned to what procedural hurdles it should
place before a public employer that, once passed, would make its
search of an employee’s protected space lawful. Citing New
Jersey v. T.L.O.,111 the Court noted, “[only] in those exceptional
circumstances in which special needs . . . make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable” should the court
abrogate that standard.112 However, the Court seemingly skipped
the special needs analysis,113 summing up its position in a
statement that “[i]t is simply unrealistic to expect supervisors in
most government agencies to learn the subtleties of the probable
cause standard.”114 Thus, the Court held that “public employer
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for non-investigatory, work-related
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct,
108

Id. at 718.
Id.
110
Id. at 719. However, the Court noted:
Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and
file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private
sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practice and
procedures, or by legitimate regulation . . . . The employee’s
expectation of privacy must be assessed in context of the employment
relation . . . . [S]ome government offices may be so open to fellow
employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable.
Id. at 717–18.
111
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
112
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 720 (alteration in original).
113
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, noted, “[a]lthough the plurality mentions
the ‘special need’ step, . . . it turns immediately to a balancing test to formulate its
standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He further stated,
“This error is significant because, given the facts of this case, no ‘special need’ exists
here to justify dispensing with the warrant and probable-cause requirements.” Id.
114
Id. at 724–25 (majority opinion).
109
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should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all
circumstances.”115
The Court articulated the standard of
reasonableness as conduct “according to the dictates of reason and
common sense.”116
The level of Fourth Amendment protection in the workplace
set by the Court in Ortega shows noticeable weaknesses. First, an
employee must prove a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
area searched, instead of in the communication apprehended,
which is no easy task. Not all employees enjoy the comfort of
private offices as the plaintiff in Ortega did. Second, an employee
must prove any monitoring was unreasonable, a circumstance
much harder to show than a lack of probable cause. As their
constitutional remedy only weakly protects them in the workplace,
public employees, like private employees, could use a more
effective statutory remedy. In contemplating one, Congress should
consider the statutory privacy protections that European countries
provide their citizens.
II. THE EUROPEAN MODEL
A. Privacy as an Aspect of Personal Dignity
Unlike the core foundation of American privacy law, largely
concerned with personal liberty, European privacy law focuses
more on protecting aspects of personal dignity.117 Why does
Europe strive to protect and guarantee certain levels of respect,
social esteem, and personal honor for its citizens? From the point
of view of many Europeans and Americans, laws protecting one’s
dignity came as a reaction against the indignities perpetrated in the
name of fascism, especially Nazism.118
On the one hand, that explanation may oversimplify the
evolution of privacy law in Europe, for, as Warren and Brandeis
115

Id. at 725–26.
Id. at 725 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985)).
117
See Whitman, supra note 4, at 1164 (“The political and social values of ‘dignity’
and ‘honor’ are indeed what is at stake in the [European] concept of privacy.”).
118
See id. at 1165. See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA
AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003).
116
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recognized,119 the history of European laws protecting dignity
began long before the postwar period.120 On the other hand, the
postwar period did play an important role in creating modern
European dignity rights, much as the Revolutionary War played its
role in fostering American liberty rights. Before the Second World
War, only high-status persons could expect to have the courts
protect their personal honor,121 while members of lower classes
lived their lives without a meaningful right to respect.122
Throughout the past seventy years, average Europeans have
“leveled-up” to experience, many, if not all, of the rights once held
only by the former ruling class.123 Now all citizens of Europe’s
core states may experience protections for their personal reputation
and personal information.124
To be sure, the American system of liberty protection is not
without its advantages over the European system of dignity
protection. Unlike the United States, where privacy means
protection from state intrusion, governments in Europe accomplish
a remarkable level of surveillance with little or no uproar from
their citizenry.125 Further, in Europe, governments enforce some
dignity norms that Americans would find absurd, perhaps even an
affront to their liberty.126 The European laws regulating childrens’
119

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214, 214 n.1 (adapting notions of French
privacy law to limit the breadth of a tort against invasion of privacy: “The right to
privacy, limited as such a right must necessarily be, has already found expression in the
law of France”).
120
Whitman, supra note 4, at 1165–66.
121
Id. at 1170–71. A disproportion of concern for royalty in European privacy thinking
still exists. For instance, “German texts list royalty first among the classes of ‘public
figures’ who require special treatment in the law of privacy, while French texts . . . only
list royalty second, after politicians.” Id. at 1169–70.
122
James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J.
1270, 1320–30 (2000).
123
See Whitman, supra note 4, at 1164–71 (“This long term secular leveling-up
tendency has shaped [European] law in a very fundamental way.”).
124
See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
125
“In Germany, everybody must be formally registered with the police at all times.”
Whitman, supra note 4, at 1158. Further, in France and Germany, “telephones are tapped
at ten to thirty times the rate they are tapped in the United States—and in the Netherlands
and Italy, at 130 to 150 times the rate.” Id. at 1159. However, as others have noted, “The
[United States] is far more predisposed to subordinate privacy to security than the
Europeans are.” Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 865.
126
See Whitman, supra note 4, at 1158.
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birth-names stand as but one example.127 Thus, in some ways,
European regulation of dignity rights may go too far. However,
one can hardly argue that, by obliging their bosses to respect the
privacy of their personal electronic communications in the
workplace,128 Europeans do not confirm in themselves at least a
somewhat heightened sense of personhood.
B. Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Directive 95/46/EC
Shortly after beginning to recover from the devastating and
costly Second World War, the countries of Europe gathered to
draft legislation, which would protect the region from further
human rights atrocities.129 The Council of Europe Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
1950 (“ECHR”) resulted from their combined efforts, and it now
forms a legal standard that each member state of the European
Union has incorporated into its national laws.130 The European
Court of Human Rights enforces the protocols of the ECHR;131
individuals appeal to the court as an applicant when they have
exhausted their domestic remedies, receiving a judgment binding
on both the individual and the respondent state.132
Europeans enjoy some significant privacy protections under the
ECHR. Article 8 of the ECHR specifically defends the right one
has “to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his
correspondence.”133 The European Court of Human Rights
extended the definition of “private life” to include the right to
protection for one’s personal matters in certain business
environments, and it expanded the definition of “correspondence”
to include email and other electronic communications.134
127

Id.
See infra Part II.B. European law also protects “the right of workers to respectful
treatment by their bosses and coworkers.” Whitman, supra note 4, at 1165.
129
See Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 871.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 872.
133
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
134
Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 872.
128
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For instance, in Niemietz v. Germany,135 the European Court of
Human Rights thought it too restrictive to limit the notion of
“private life” to an “inner circle” where an individual may live as
he chooses, excluding from the definition everything outside that
circle.136 Instead, the court found that “private life” may include
“activities of a professional or business nature”137 because, at
times, one may not be able to distinguish clearly whether “an
individual’s activities form part of his personal or business life.”138
Niemietz involved a search of the law office premises of the
applicant, Mr. Niemietz, to find information relevant to a crime of
insult, an illegal act in Germany.139 The authorities used a warrant
to conduct the search, trying to discover the author of an offensive
letter, which constituted the insult.140 The court found that the
“search impinged on [applicant’s] secrecy to an extent . . .
disproportionate [under] the circumstances,”141 thus, it concluded
that the search resulted in a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR.142
However, finding an absence of damages, the court dismissed
applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.143
In another case, Halford v. United Kingdom,144 the European
Court of Human Rights applied Article 8 of the ECHR to the
interception of personal phone calls at work. It found “telephone
calls made from business premises as well as from the home may

135

Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (1992).
Id. ¶ 29 (“Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to
establish . . . relationships with human beings.”).
137
See id. (“[I]t is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of
people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with
[people].”).
138
Id.
139
Id. ¶¶ 6–16.
140
Id. ¶ 10.
141
Id. ¶ 37 (expressing concern that “the attendant publicity must have been capable of
affecting adversely the applicant’s professional reputation, in the eyes of both his existing
clients and of the public at large”).
142
Id. ¶ 38.
143
Id. ¶ 43 (“[A]lthough Mr. Niemietz stated at the hearing that his request extended to
his costs and expenses referable to the proceedings . . . he has supplied no particulars of
that expenditure.”).
144
Halford v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523 (1997).
136
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be covered by the notions of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’
within the meaning of Article 8.”145
In Halford, the applicant, an assistant chief constable,
complained that her employer, the Merseyside Police Authority,
intercepted calls made from her office telephone.146 Prior to the
monitoring, she had sued the police department for sexual
harassment, as the authority had denied her several promotions.147
Before the European Court of Human Rights, the United Kingdom
government, representing the view of the police authority,
submitted that telephone calls one makes from the workplace fall
outside the protection of Article 8.148 The court disagreed and held
that the telephone calls applicant made sat “within the scope of
‘private life’ and ‘correspondence.’”149 In its decision, the court
noted that the police authority had not explicitly told applicant her
calls would be liable to interception and that this gave applicant a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in those calls.150 The decision
in Halford posits an interesting solution to the problem of
employee monitoring. It suggests that such monitoring will not
violate Article 8 if the employer achieves express notice and
consent from its employee.151
Europeans receive another layer of protection from monitoring
through European Council Directive 95/46 (“Directive 95/46/EC”
or “the Directive”),152 the directive on the protection of personal
data. “Directive 95/46/EC establishes a ‘minimum framework’ of
data protection requirements,”153 which each member state of the
European Community implemented into law. “These requirements
145

Id. ¶ 44.
See id. ¶17.
147
See id. ¶¶ 10–11.
148
See id. ¶ 43 (“At the hearing before the Court, counsel for the Government
expressed the view that an employer should in principle, without prior knowledge of the
employee, be able to monitor calls made by the latter on telephones provided by the
employer.”).
149
Id. ¶ 46.
150
Id. ¶ 45.
151
Id. ¶ 44.
152
Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
153
Lothar Determann et al., Global Data Transfers and the European Directive A
Practical Analysis of the New ICC Contract Clauses, 4 PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 153,
154 (2005).
146
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apply to any collection, use, disclosure, or other processing of
information about an identified or identifiable natural person in the
[European Economic Area].”154 “[T]he definition of ‘processing
of personal data’ set out in Article 2 of Directive 95/46/EC also
covers all forms of computer surveillance,” including the
monitoring
of
personally
identifiable
electronic
155
communications.
Thus, the Directive has omnibus scope, and it
“applies broadly to all industries and business sectors,” both
private and public.156 It certainly applies to monitoring in the
workplace.157
Article 7 of the Directive states, “Member States shall provide
that personal data may be processed only if” the processing meets
one of six exceptions.158 Exception (a), the most important
exception for the sake of this Article, allows data processing when
“the data subject has unambiguously given his consent.”159 Article
2 of the act further defines consent as “any freely given and
informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject
signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being
processed.”160 Thus, these provisions require consent that is
“freely given, specific and informed.”161 Under this conception of
consent, any employer that wishes to monitor its employee must
notify the employee of the nature and purpose of the monitoring,
which must be specific and not over-general, and then it must
achieve express consent.162
Taken together, the ECHR and Directive 95/46/EC give
significant protections to both private and public employees in
Europe.
By experiencing privacy as to their personal
154

Id.
Roberto F. Filho & Mark Jeffery, Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy:
Notice and Consent, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 551, 554 (2002).
156
See Determann et al., supra note 153, at 154.
157
See Filho & Jeffery, supra note 155, at 562–67.
158
Council Directive 95/46, art. 7, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC).
159
Id.
160
Council Directive 95/46, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 (EC).
161
See Filho & Jeffery, supra note 155, at 564.
162
See id. at 564–65 (“[T]here remains a considerable margin of doubt . . . over the
closely-related question of whether consent must be given every time the employer
conducts a particular form of surveillance or processing; or whether a general, once-andfor-all consent to a certain form of processing would be valid.”).
155
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communications and data at work, Europeans may, indeed, feel
more dignified in the workplace. But, are their liberty interests
more protected?—Arguably not. Enforcement of Article 8 of the
ECHR against government authorities acting pursuant to protocol
suffers from noticeable weaknesses,163 and Directive 95/46/EC
entirely exempts processing “necessary for compliance with a legal
obligation.”164 Further, in some ways, both schemes for protecting
privacy may go too far. Neither the ECHR nor the Directive has a
clearly articulated exemption for employee monitoring an
employer undertakes in the ordinary course of business, and as
discussed above, some instances do exist that justify employee
monitoring. Therefore, this Article does not advance that the
United States should engage in the full-scale adoption of European
protections for electronic communications. The United States
may, however, take something of value from the work-place
privacy protections implemented by its neighbors across the
Atlantic.
III. REDEFINING CONSENT: RECOGNIZING LIBERTY AND DIGNITY
A. The Importance of Dignity
Professor Bloustein, a noted privacy scholar, once wrote,
“[A]nalysis of the interest involved in . . . privacy cases is of
utmost significance because in our own day scientific and
technological advances have raised the spectre of new and
frightening invasions of privacy.”165 His statement confronted a
pressing reality that is ever more true today, especially in the
workplace. In 2004, a survey of employer monitoring confirmed
that 74% of responding companies monitor the outgoing and
incoming email of their employees and that 60% monitor

163

For instance, in Niemietz, even after finding the warrant at issue faulty, the court did
not award the applicant any just compensation. See Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 23 (1992); supra notes 135–43 and accompanying text. Perhaps that is why
Niemietz and Halford number among the select few cases addressing Article 8 of the
ECHR in the last twenty years.
164
Council Directive 95/46, art. 7, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC).
165
Bloustein, supra note 7, at 963.
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employee Internet connections.166 Further, as Justice Blackmun
noted in his dissent in Ortega, “It is, unfortunately, all too true that
the workplace has become another home for most working
Americans. . . . Consequently, an employee’s private life must
intersect with the workplace.”167
When confronted with these actualities, perhaps then, all
Americans should respond as Professor Bloustein did. In his 1964
article, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, he explained that
just as we may regard these intrusions “as offensive to our concept
of individualism and the liberty it entails, so too should we regard
privacy as a dignitary [injury].”168 In other words, the United
States needs to consider laws that protect privacy not only as an
aspect of liberty, but also as an aspect of dignity. By implementing
the changes to ECPA that this Article suggests below, Congress
may be able to accomplish that goal for employees in the
workplace.
Before considering a change to ECPA, which would increase
its dignity protections, however, this Article must address one last
aspect of liberty that comes into play with business entities:
freedom of contract. In the past, the Supreme Court struck down
laws limiting freedom of contract in the employer/employee
context, characterizing the dispute as a conflict between “the
power of the State to legislate or the right of the individual to
liberty.”169 While some of the cases espousing freedom of contract
166

See Reginald C. Govan & Freddie Mac, Workplace Privacy, in 33RD ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 245, 251 (Practising Law Institute 2004) (noting the
study also “found a positive correlation between the size of the company and its level of
monitoring and surveillance, with the largest companies conducting the most
surveillance”).
167
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 739 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168
See Bloustein, supra note 7, at 1002 (speaking of the torts protecting privacy).
Bloustein also noted, “The right to privacy in the form we know it, however, had to await
the advent of the urbanization of our way of life . . . because only then was a significant
and everyday threat to personal dignity . . . realized.” Id. at 984.
169
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1906). In Lochner, the Supreme
Court considered a statute that restricted the power of employers to require their
employees, in this case bakers, to work over sixty hours a week. Id. at 52–53. The Court
saw the statute as unconstitutional, noting:
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between
the employer and employees, concerning the number of hours in
which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer. The
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as a fundamental right fell into disfavor during the New Deal,
freedom of contract remains an aspect central to the American idea
of liberty. As European courts hold little respect for contracts
signed in the employment context,170 any consideration of
European dignity protections will have to ignore that aspect of
European law; it is too incompatible with American ideals.
B. Looking to Europe for Help in Amending ECPA
In suggesting a change to American law to increase dignity
protections, this Article looks across the Atlantic to those countries
more familiar with privacy as an aspect of dignity, just as Warren
and Brandeis did in their privacy article. Yet this Article does not
propose to completely do away with the statutory scheme already
in place. Instead, it posits that, with only small changes, ECPA
can provide for worker dignity and allow for justified employer
monitoring. Employees need a more robust ECPA because, for
private employees, it forms one of the only protections they have.
Public employees would benefit too, since they receive little
protection from the Fourth Amendment.
As the first amendment to ECPA, Congress should eliminate
employer eligibility for the service provider exceptions in both the
Wiretap Act under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)171 and the SCA under
18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1),172 when the case concerns monitoring of
an employee. As illustrated above, courts have interpreted these
exceptions in such a way as to make other exceptions, such as
consent, redundant and meaningless.173 The SCA’s service
provider exception stands as the prime example.174
Most
general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution (citation omitted). Under that provision no
State can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.
Id. at 53.
170
See Determann et al., supra note 153, at 156.
171
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
172
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
173
See supra Part I.C.
174
Remember, this exemption was read by the Third Circuit to “except from [the
SCA’s] protection all searches by communications service providers.” Fraser v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 2003).
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employers provide email and Internet service to their employees,
and classifying these employers as service providers when they do
so exempts them from the SCA, leaving them free to monitor their
employees without regard to whether the monitoring addresses a
legitimate business concern.
As a second amendment to ECPA, Congress should implement
the ordinary course of business exception as defined by the court in
Watkins for both the Wiretap Act and the SCA.175 For the Wiretap
Act, this would mean adding additional provisions to the current
exception under 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (5)(a).176 For the SCA, this
would mean creating an entirely new exemption under 18 U.S.C. §
2701(c).177 The ordinary course of business exception should
entitle an employer only to monitor the communications of an
employee if the communication pertains to a legitimate business
concern. As explained by Watkins, this exception must have
limited scope;178 there must be minimization of the harm to the
employee’s dignity.
The minimization requirement of the statute should provide for
the following contingencies. If an employer seeks to monitor a
communication to find out whether it is business related or
personal, the employer must immediately cease monitoring when it
discovers the communication is indeed personal. In the context of
personal telephone communications, an employer should not listen
for more than three minutes before ceasing to monitor the call.179
In the context of email communications, an employer should not
review more than the subject line of the email. In the context of
Internet usage, an employer should, as in the phone context, not
examine more than three minutes of usage, whether the usage is
intercepted or stored. All of these limits should apply during a

175

See supra notes 73–85 and accompanying text.
Currently, the exception listed here does not require minimization, as Watkins does.
See Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d. 577, 583–84 (11th Cir. 1983).
177
The ordinary course of business exception for employers could replace the service
provider exception currently found in 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1).
178
See Watkins, 704 F.2d. at 583–84.
179
Three minutes is the length of time used by the court in Watkins. See id. at 585.
Upon further analysis of the time it takes to determine if a call is business or personal,
this three minute limit could be revised.
176
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calendar day. That is, employers should only be able to take one
“peak” per day.
This minimization requirement raises another concern, which
may warrant an additional “poisonous fruits” provision.
Employers may attempt to benefit from personal information they
overhear even when they abide by the guidelines set out above.
Thus, Congress should limit the use of any personal information
“accidentally” attained while an employer “peaks” to see if the
communication is for business or personal reasons. Congress
should also limit the use of any personal information attained while
monitoring a communication in the ordinary course of business,180
unless the personal information is inseparably intertwined with a
legitimate business purpose. Moreover, misuse of personal
information should constitute a violation of ECPA.
As the final, and most important, amendment, Congress should
alter the consent provisions of the Wiretap Act and the SCA. As
discussed above, freedom to contract forms a central aspect of
American liberty, and as such, Congress should not eliminate the
provision altogether. However, current interpretations of consent
to monitoring of personal communications in the workplace create
an unworkable and undignified solution. How can an employee
freely contract when a court implies the employee’s consent, or
rather, finds the consent of another adequate?181 In order to
preserve the bargaining power of an employee, and therefore the
employee’s dignity and liberty, Congress should adopt some of the
consent provisions of Directive 95/46/EC.
In amending the consent provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)
and adding a similar consent provision to § 2701(c), Congress
should require that any consent to monitoring of personal
communications be freely given, specific, and informed.182 It

180
Some business communications, undoubtedly, contain personal information, as
many people engage in business relationships with their personal friends or become
personal friends with those they engage in business with.
181
See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
182
See supra note 161 and accompanying text; Council Directive 95/46, art. 2, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 (EC).
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should also be explicit and unambiguous.183 In practice, this
means that an employee should have full notice of the scope of and
the justifications for the monitoring of personal communications.
Full notice would be beneficial because the alternative,
“widespread individual ignorance[,] hinders development through
the privacy marketplace of appropriate norms about personal data
use.”184 The employer should give the employee a form detailing
the extent of the monitoring for the employee to sign. The form
should have no other provisions than those dealing with the
monitoring of personal, non-business, communications. The
employer should ask the employee—orally, not in writing—if the
employee understands the provisions, and the employer should
offer further explanation, if necessary. Last, the employee should
have to sign the form next to a statement of explicit consent for the
monitoring of the employee’s personal communications.
All of the above-mentioned steps may sound tedious, and they
are. However, one must remember that the amendments this
Article suggests would also reaffirm an ordinary course of business
exception to monitoring. The above stated consent exception
would apply only to personal communications, allowing an
employee to ask why the employer feels it necessary to monitor
personal communications. Its specificity requirement would limit
the scope of monitoring to the extent the employer can justify.
Moreover, the consent exception would provide a bargaining point
in employment negotiations. If an employer feels it must monitor
extensively to protect itself, perhaps it will have to pay its
employees a little more.185
This Article needs to address one last aspect of the consent
exception for ECPA: the default rule.186 That is, in the absence of
explicit consent, what will the rule be? A simple answer to that
183

See supra note 159 and accompanying text; Council Directive 95/46, art. 7, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC).
184
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1683 (1999).
185
Id. at 1681–91; cf. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1246–47 (1998).
186
Jerry Kang has addressed the importance of default rules. See Kang, supra note 185,
at 1247–59 (“Unless the parties agree otherwise, the information collector should process
personal data only in functionally necessary ways.”).
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question exists: in the absence of consent, either employer
interception of personal communications or employer access of
stored personal communications will violate ECPA. Besides the
ordinary course of business exception, no other exception would
apply.187 In this way, the default rule presents employees with a
choice, and freedom to choose would enhance both the liberty and
the dignity of the employee.188
Some might argue that “high transaction costs may convert this
‘default’ rule into a practically ‘immutable’ rule.”189 For instance,
on the one hand, a small employer may not have the infrastructure
to secure informed consent. In that case, all employees would
enjoy the full protections under ECPA for their personal
communications. Large companies, on the other hand, will likely
have the infrastructure to secure consent. However, cost cutting
across the business as a whole will encourage such a company to
restrict its monitoring to the extent it is necessary,190 especially if
employees argue for higher pay to counter the intrusion into their
personal lives.
C. Responding to Warren and Brandeis’ Call
In the conclusion of their article, The Right to Privacy, Warren
and Brandeis commented, “[L]aw has always recognized a man’s
house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers
engaged in the execution of its commands.”191 Then the two
authors rebuked, “Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to
constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or
prurient curiosity?”192
In the terms of this Article, Warren and Brandeis seem to have
suggested: Why should the law only protect one’s privacy as an
187
That is, no other exception would apply for employer use of the information.
Government use may still be excepted under other provisions.
188
See Kang, supra note 185, at 1259–65 (“[S]urveillance is in tension with human
dignity.”).
189
Id. at 1250.
190
Id. at 1250–51 (“[E]ven if transaction costs are not large enough to transform default
rules into immutable ones, the default rule still matters because ‘it determines who will
bargain and at what cost.’”).
191
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 220.
192
Id.
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aspect of liberty—freedom from the intrusion of the state in one’s
own home, when it could also protect privacy as an aspect of
dignity—freedom from the intrusion of everyone, including the
state, in one’s personal affairs? While each side of the Atlantic
may view liberty or dignity as the core inviolable right subject to
privacy protection, perhaps here in the United States we can
enhance our dignity protections without sacrificing our liberty or
the concerns of our businesses. By amending ECPA, Congress
may be able to accomplish just such an ideal for American
employees, protecting privacy as an aspect of liberty and dignity.

